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I. Introduction
Drug trafficking is a problem of serious concern to all nations.  Despite massive 
efforts2 to combat the drug trade, the United States and other countries have been unable 
to effectively bring major perpetrators to justice.  Traffickers often operate with impunity 
in areas where governments are unwilling or unable to prosecute.3  Countries that do wish 
to prosecute are frequently helpless because they cannot establish personal jurisdiction 
over suspected traffickers located outside of their boarders.4  The problems associated 
with prosecuting those involved in the international drug trade are of such complexity 
and gravity that they defy easy solution.  There are tools, however, that the international 
community can employ to hold traffickers accountable.  
1 Law clerk to the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen, District Judge, United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois; J.D. 2003, Georgetown University Law Center.  
The author would like to thank Professor David Luban for his thoughtful comments on 
several drafts of this article. 
2 In 2004, the requested budget for drug control in the United States is $11.7 billion. 
OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRUG 
DATA SUMMARY 6 (March 2003). 
3 Columbia is just one example of a country that is unwilling and unable to prosecute its 
citizens.  See Alan Seagrave, Conflict in Colombia: How Can Rebel Forces, Paramilitary 
Groups, Drug Traffickers, & Government Forces Be Held Liable for Human Rights 
Violations in a Country Where Impunity Reigns Supreme? 25 NOVA L. REV. 525, 527 
(2001) (noting that less than three percent of crimes are successfully prosecuted in 
Columbia).
4 Another major problem is bringing perpetrators into the state that wishes to prosecute, 
through extradition or otherwise.  Although this is an issue of major concern, it is beyond 
the scope of this paper and will not be addressed. 
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One possible tool that has been suggested, although never widely embraced, is to 
allow states to prosecute drug traffickers using universal jurisdiction.  Universal 
jurisdiction allows any state to exercise jurisdiction to prosecute a suspect wherever he is 
found, regardless of the location of his crimes, his nationality, or any other contacts with 
the prosecuting state.5  This paper argues that the international community should 
embrace drug trafficking as a universal jurisdiction crime in two ways.  First, states 
should adopt an additional protocol to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter “the 1988 
Convention)6 clearly establishing universal jurisdiction for drug trafficking and thereby 
filling jurisdictional gaps in existing treaty law.  Second, states, and the United States in 
particular, should amend their municipal legislation on drug trafficking to reflect an 
acceptance of universal jurisdiction.  These two actions, if undertaken by a sufficient 
number of states, will create universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking as a matter of 
customary international law.  Once established as customary international law, it will 
truly become possible for any state to establish universal jurisdiction over members of the 
international drug trade, regardless of whether or not that state is a party to the 1988 
Convention or the additional protocol.  It is only at this point that drug trafficking will 
become a true universal jurisdiction crime and that traffickers will not be immune from 
prosecution, regardless of their location.   
5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, cmt. a 
§ 403 (1987) (“international law permits any state to apply its laws to punish certain 
offenses although the state has no links of territory with the offense, or of nationality with 
the offender (or even the victim).”).
6 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), 28 I.L.M. 493.
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This paper does not suggest that universal jurisdiction should be asserted over 
anyone who brings any quantity of drugs, no matter how small, across an international 
boarder.  Rather, universal jurisdiction should be exercised only in the most serious drug 
cases involving large quantities of narcotics or people involved in the upper echelons of a 
widespread trafficking network.  In order to clearly set out the difference between what 
crimes could be subject to prosecution under a universal jurisdiction theory and what 
crimes would not, the additional protocol to the 1988 Convention should define “serious” 
drug trafficking offenses.  The protocol should require that before a state can exercise 
universal jurisdiction, it must present preliminary evidence of drug trafficking plus one of 
the following factors: 1) “involvement in the offense of an organized criminal group to 
which the offender belongs;” 2) “involvement of the offender in other international 
organized criminal activities;” 3) “the involvement of the offender in other illegal 
activities facilitated by the commission of the offense;” 4) “the use of violence or arms by 
the offender;” or 5) “the fact that the offender holds a public office and that the offence is 
committed with the office in question.”7  These categories draw on the already existing 
list of “particularly serious” drug trafficking offenses found in Article 3(5) of the 1988 
Convention and will ensure that small time drug dealers are not subject to prosecution 
under a universal jurisdiction theory.         
Of course, universal jurisdiction is by no means a panacea for the enormous 
problems faced by the international community with regard to drug trafficking.  This 
paper makes no claims that the assertion of universal jurisdiction against drug traffickers 
7 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, art. 3(5)(a)-(e), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), 28 I.L.M. 
493.
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will be such a powerful deterrent force that it will convince drug traffickers to 
discontinue their work and to find a new trade.  Universal jurisdiction is, however, one 
tool that can be placed in the arsenal of states wishing to confront drug traffickers and
hold them accountable for their crimes.  Given the enormous difficulties faced by the 
international community in controlling the international drug trade, states should not 
disregard any useful tool that will help bring drug traffickers to justice. 
 Part II of this paper describes the serious problems presented to the world 
community by the drug trade.  Part III sets out the general requirements for the 
establishment of a universal jurisdiction crime.  Part IV examines whether or not drug 
trafficking fits the requirements that are outlined in Part III.  Ultimately, Part IV 
concludes that although some states may currently exercise universal jurisdiction over 
drug traffickers, the international community should solidify and clarify this power by 
enacting an additional protocol to the 1988 Convention.  Part V examines the arguments 
against expanding universal jurisdiction and concludes that these arguments are not of 
sufficient magnitude to bar the assertion of universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers.  
Finally, Part VI argues that the United States should lead the effort to recognize drug 
trafficking as a universal jurisdiction crime because it has a special interest in combating 
drug trafficking throughout the world.
II. The Global Menace of Drug Trafficking
Drugs are obviously dangerous to those who use them.  In the United States alone, 
19,698 people died from causes related to the consumption of narcotics during 2000.8
8 OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRUG 
DATA SUMMARY 2 (March 2003). 
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Intravenous drug use is responsible for the transmission of the AIDS virus, causing an 
estimated five percent of the total number of new AIDS cases.9  Yet those who use drugs 
are by no means the only people negatively affected by drug trafficking.  The global drug 
trade destabilizes governments, corrupts officials, funds terrorist organizations, breeds 
large-scale organized crime, and results in significant loss of human life.  Indeed, drugs 
are linked to serious violence, organized crime, and political strife throughout the world.  
Drug trafficking provides a valuable source of funding to insurgent movements 
and thus often undermines the stability of national governments.  In Columbia, for 
example, violent paramilitary groups rely on cocaine production to fund their decades-old 
civil war.10  One writer estimates that Columbia’s war has displaced more than one 
million civilians and has killed 35,000 people in the past ten years.11  The Shining Path 
organization, a violent guerilla organization funded by cocaine and designed to overthrow 
the government of Peru, killed an estimated 30,000 people during the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s.  Although disbanded 1992, the organization has recently resurfaced and is 
again posing a threat to stability in Peru today.12  Drugs can also be a destabilizing force 
within existing governments because of their incredible power to corrupt.  The United 
States has identified corruption among judges, who are bribed to release prominent drug 
traffickers rather than prosecute them, as one of the major problems posed by the drug 
9 UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ 
en/drug_demand_hiv_aids.html (last visited April 22, 2003). 
10 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 3 (2003).
11 Alan Seagrave, Conflict in Colombia: How Can Rebel Forces, Paramilitary Groups, 
Drug Traffickers, & Government Forces Be Held Liable for Human Rights Violations in 
a Country Where Impunity Reigns Supreme? 25 NOVA L. REV. 525, 528 (2001).
12 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 4 (2003).
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industry.13  Those who are not corrupted by drug traffickers face serious consequences: in 
Columbia, “[n]umerous government officials, including a minister of justice, an attorney 
general, a dozen Supreme Court judges, and a former head of the Antinarcotics Police, 
have been murdered for their efforts to enforce the country’s narcotics laws.”14
Even in those countries that are not completely destabilized by the drug trade, the 
link between crime and drugs is indisputable.  Within the United States, an estimated 795 
people were murdered as a result of their participation in drug use or sales in 1998.15  In 
1998, 138,000 convicted inmates in the U.S. reported that they were under the influence 
of drugs when they committed the crimes for which they were imprisoned and 61,000 
reported that they committed their crimes in order to obtain money for drugs.16 The list of 
drug trafficking related crimes seems endless, including, “murder, firearms offenses, 
racketeering, conspiracy, bribery, tax evasion, banking violations, and money 
laundering.”17  Drugs also create enormous financial costs to society. In 2000, the United 
States Office of National Drug Control Policy estimated that the total cost to society of 
drug use in the United States was $160.7 billion.18
13 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 7 (2003).
14 Sharon A. Gardner, A Global Initiative to Deter Drug Trafficking: Will 
Internaltionalizing the Drug War Work? 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 287, 292 (1993) 
(citing LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COLUMBIA, A COUNTRY STUDY 307-08 (1990)).
15 OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
DRUG-RELATED CRIME 4 (2003). 
16 OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
DRUG DATA SUMMARY 2 (2003).
17Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the 
Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 75, 76-77 (2000).
18 OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
DRUG DATA SUMMARY 2 (2003).
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The effects of the global drug trade reach beyond the human realm; researchers 
also point to the enormous environmental consequences of drug trafficking.  The U.S. 
government estimates that over six million acres of rainforest have been destroyed in the 
past twenty years in order to clear farmland for cocoa production.19  Farmers who grow 
narcotics focus on optimum yield and thus are largely negligent about following 
environmental regulations regarding fertilizers and pesticides.20  The production of 
cocaine also requires several toxic chemicals.  The waste from the process is often 
dumped onto the ground or into local waterways,21 causing environmental damage that 
affects both humans and wildlife.  
According to the United States government, the problem of drugs has recently 
taken on new dimensions because of the link between drug trafficking and terrorism.22
Terrorists and drug traffickers often have common interests.  For example, both benefit 
from “military skills, weapons supply, and access to clandestine organizations.”23
Likewise, “[t]errorists gain a source of revenue and expertise in illicit transfer and 
laundering of money for their operations.”24  Both terrorists and drug traffickers attempt 
19 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 10 (2003).
20 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 10 (2003).
21 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 10 (2003).
22 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., THE NEXUS 
BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls
/fs/9242.htm (last visited April 10, 2003).
23 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., THE NEXUS 
BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls
/fs/9242.htm (last visited April 10, 2003).
24 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., THE NEXUS 
BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls
/fs/9242.htm (last visited April 10, 2003).
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to corrupt officials for the purpose of clandestinely crossing international boarders.  
Finally, both benefit from and often choose to operate in countries with weakened 
political infrastructures so that they can carry out their plans with impunity.  For example, 
prior to the United States’ invasion, Afghanistan was used as a staging ground for 
terrorist training and served as one of the world’s largest supplier of heroin.25  These 
common interests often result in direct links between drug traffickers and terrorists 
because each can benefit from the operations of the other.             
There is no question that the international drug trade creates serious human and 
financial costs worldwide.  As the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs recently wrote:
As the single greatest source of illegal revenue, the drug trade has 
long been the mainstay of violent political insurgencies, rogue 
regimes, international terrorist organizations, and terrorists of every 
stripe.  Whether through heroin that financed the former Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan or the cocaine that sustains the decades old 
insurgency in Colombia, the drug trade generates the money that is 
the lifeblood of the violence that increasingly threatens global peace 
and security.26
As a result, the international community has long searched for effective means of 
combating the drug trade.  This paper discusses one possible mean for bringing 
international drug traffickers to justice: the exercise of universal jurisdiction over persons 
accused of serious drug trafficking crimes. 
25 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 5 (2003).
26 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2 at 3 (2003). 
9
III. The Requirements for Establishing a Universal Jurisdiction Crime.
Universal jurisdiction is the right of a state to “define and prescribe punishment 
for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern”27
regardless of whether the prosecuting state can establish a connection with the 
perpetrator, victim, or location of the offense.  As is the case with much of international 
law, it is often difficult to discern clear principles with respect to universal jurisdiction. 
There is no set test for when an offense ripens into a universal jurisdiction crime.  Thus, 
there is constant scholarly and legal debate over what crimes should be afforded universal 
jurisdiction status.28  Despite this lack of clarity, an examination of acts that are generally 
accepted as universal jurisdiction crimes suggests some coherent guidelines.
   As a general matter, the crime must be one of such international concern that it 
invokes one of the two traditional theoretical rationales for universal jurisdiction.  The 
first rationale is pragmatic in that it “provides a basis for jurisdiction when jurisdiction is 
hard to be found.” 29  Under this theory, universal jurisdiction responds to the danger that 
no state will be able to establish jurisdiction by traditional means (such as through a 
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 403 
(1987). 
28 For example, there has been much debate over whether genocide is a universal 
jurisdiction crime.  On the one hand, legal scholars widely agree that genocide is a 
universal jurisdiction crime as a matter of customary international law. See, e.g.,
PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION princ. 2(1) (2001) (listing genocide as a universal jurisdiction 
crime).  On the other hand, the genocide convention does not provide for universal 
jurisdiction.  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
December 9, 1948, art. 6, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Thus, the question arises, is genocide a 
universal jurisdiction crime because of the status afforded to it by scholarly consensus or 
does the lack of jurisdiction provided in the treaty reflect such a rejection by states as to 
render void any claims that genocide is subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of 
customary international law?  
29 Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations 
Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L. 1, 31 (2000).
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territorial link between the offender and the prosecuting state).  This “pragmatic 
rationale” therefore ensures that criminals do not go free merely because no state is able 
or willing to assert subject matter jurisdiction.  
The second rationale for universal jurisdiction is humanitarian; if a crime is 
considered so heinous or detrimental to the world community, then any member of the 
world community has a right to prosecute that crime to ensure that perpetrators do not go 
unpunished. 30  This second type of universal jurisdiction is based not on a territorial link 
with the prosecuting state; rather it is the nature of the crime itself that provides a basis 
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.31
Piracy, which is recognized as the first universal jurisdiction crime, is an example 
of a crime that has become subject to prosecution by any state for practical reasons.32
States have long recognized universal jurisdiction in the case of piracy because of 
difficulty in establishing jurisdiction over pirates by traditional, territorial means.33
30 Thus, “precisely because a state exercising universal jurisdiction does so on behalf of 
the international community, it must place the overall interests of the international 
community above its own.” M. Charif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes: Historical Perspectives & Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 89 
(2001).    
31 “[U]niversal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, 
without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or 
convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state 
exercising such jurisdiction.” PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION princ. 1(1)  (2001).
32 M. Charif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives & Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 109 (2001) (noting that 
Grotius viewed the problem of piracy pragmatically, suggesting that universal 
jurisdiction be used as a means of establishing freedom on the high seas).
33 One author asserts that states have exercised universal jurisdiction over pirates for the 
past 500 years.  See Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or An 
International Criminal Court Accomplish This Goal? 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 357, 365 
(2002).
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Pirates caught on the high seas often did not fly the flag of any state and were therefore 
beyond the jurisdictional reach of most states.34  As a means of ensuring that pirates were 
held accountable for their acts, the international community declared them to be hostis 
humani generis35 (enemies of all mankind) and agreed that they could be prosecuted in 
any state without establishing specific jurisdictional ties to that state.  
Piracy is therefore the paradigm example of the pragmatic rationale for universal 
jurisdiction.  It is not a universal jurisdiction crime because it is particularly heinous 
when compared with other crimes. 36  For example, piracy today probably kills less 
people than car jacking, but car jacking is not considered a universal jurisdiction crime 
because there is clear territorial jurisdiction based on a link between the perpetrator and a 
state that is willing to prosecute in car jacking cases.  Rather, to fit into the pragmatic 
rationale for universal jurisdiction the crime must be one that would be otherwise 
difficult or impossible to prosecute.
During the twentieth century, the pragmatic approach largely gave way to a 
second basis for universal jurisdiction.  Beginning with the prosecutions against former 
Nazis in Nuremberg37 and continuing with the establishment of criminal tribunals to deal 
34 Of course, the state of the victim could always establish jurisdiction; thus universal 
jurisdiction was not necessary in all cases.  Still, jurisdiction was difficult to extend 
because “[p]irates operated on the high seas, which lay outside the territorial jurisdiction 
of any nation, a sort of global commons.” Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: 
Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=
385900 (last visited April 3, 2003).
35 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820). 
36 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation, at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=385900 (last visited April 3, 2003).
37 See Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction: 
Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or An International 
Criminal Court Accomplish This Goal? 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 357, 365-66 (2002).
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with the atrocities committed in Rwanda and Yugoslavia,38 a consensus began to build 
that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is permissible to prosecute crimes that constitute 
gross human rights violations. 39  The new crimes that became subject to universal 
jurisdiction were those that had risen to the level of jus cogens40 violations in 
international law, including genocide, war crimes, and torture.  In these cases, the 
rationale for the exercise of universal jurisdiction is based on the consensus that these 
crimes are so egregious that they offend the entire world community and therefore any 
member of the world community is entitled to prosecute perpetrators.
There may be pragmatic reasons for allowing states to exercise universal 
jurisdiction in the case of human rights-based universal jurisdiction crimes.  For example, 
war crimes may go unprosecuted because they are committed entirely within one state, 
against that state’s nationals, by a state that has no interest in bringing itself to justice for 
crimes that it committed.41  In that case, there would be no jurisdictional basis other than 
universal jurisdiction for an outside country to intervene.  Universal jurisdiction in this 
case would be based on two possible rationales: the pragmatic rationale that criminals 
will go free if there is no country that is willing or able to prosecute and the human-rights 
based rationale that war crimes are so atrocious that they are a matter of concern to all 
38 Id. at 367. 
39 See M. Charif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives & Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 82 (2001) (noting that 
“[t]he exercise of universal jurisdiction is generally reserved for the most serious of 
international crimes.”).  
40 Jus cogens rules are those that are “of paramount importance for world public order, 
and cannot be set aside or modified in a subsequent treaty.” Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere 
Aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
PROCEDURE & ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 15, 21 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
41 Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in 
Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 153 
(1996).
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nations.42 In short, although the two bases of universal jurisdiction are conceptually 
independent of each other, they often overlap in practice.   This paper will examine both 
rationales separately as applied to the case of drug trafficking.  It is worth bearing in 
mind, however, that the use of one rationale does not exclude the other and that the two 
may be combined in any argument that drug trafficking should be a universal jurisdiction 
crime.  
With these two theoretical bases in mind, it is also important to examine the 
means by which a crime develops into a universal jurisdiction crime.  First, a crime can 
become subject to universal jurisdiction through the development of customary 
international law, as evidenced by domestic legislation, international agreements, and the 
commentary of international law scholars.43  Today, crimes that have become subject to 
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law include: piracy, slavery, 
42 Indeed, the human rights based rationale for war crimes can be traced back to the age 
of chivalry in the early fourteenth century.  At that time, “criminal liability applied to any 
member of the knighthood on the basis of custody over the offender regardless of his 
nationality.  A breach of the codes and customs of the jus militare resulted in a 
univerality of jurisdiction.  Honour was fundamental to the military profession and 
anyone who violated the rules of war or used prohibited weaponry could be tried and 
punished because of the dishonour caused.  Violations included acts such as the use of 
poison.” LYAL S. SUNGA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR 
SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 104 (Dordrecht:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) (citing
KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR chs. II & III (1965)).  Thus, the humanitarian rationale for 
universal jurisdiction dates back even further than the pragmatic rationale associated with 
piracy.
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 403 
cmt. a (1987).
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war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture.44  As is 
true with all of customary international law, this list is not static.  As the law develops, it 
is possible for other offenses to become widely accepted as subject to universal 
jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law.45
Second, countries may establish universal jurisdiction over an offense by treaty.  
Such treaties contain a requirement that state parties “extradite or prosecute” offenders 
(in technical parlance, this requirement is often referred to as aut dedere aut judicare).46
Those states are then required to enact legislation giving themselves jurisdiction in any 
case where the state chooses not to extradite.  In other words, state parties are required to 
assert jurisdiction over the parties whether or not they have any link with the suspect or 
with the crime.  This is a form of universal jurisdiction; however it is not as complete as 
universal jurisdiction established by customary international law because it does not 
extend to states that are not parties to the treaty, nor does it allow any  state to prosecute -
it only extends universal jurisdiction to the state where the accused is found.  If a treaty is 
widely enough accepted and implemented in state practice, however, the universal 
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
403 (1987); PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES 
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, princ. 2(1) (2001). 
45 See PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, princ. 2 (2001) (“The application of universal jurisdiction to 
the crimes listed in paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the application of universal 
jurisdiction to other crimes under international law.”); see also Id. at princ. 13(3) (“These 
Principles shall not be construed as limiting the continued development of universal 
jurisdiction in international law.”).  
46 Treaties that contain such provisions include treaties on hijacking, terrorism, torture, 
and apartheid.  Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon 
for All Nations Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2000).
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jurisdiction requirement can become binding as a matter of customary international law 
upon all states, whether or not they are parties to the treaty.47
In sum, there are four relevant considerations in determining whether a particular 
crime is subject to universal jurisdiction.  The first two relate to whether or not a crime 
fits the theoretical bases for universal jurisdiction: 1) whether universal jurisdiction is 
required as a pragmatic matter and/or 2) whether universal jurisdiction is required in 
order to ensure that gross human rights violations do not go unpunished.  Although 
meeting either of these theoretical requirements does not automatically confer authority 
upon a state to exercise universal jurisdiction, it is unlikely that a crime could attain 
universal jurisdiction status without meeting one of these traditional justifications.  Next, 
a crime must meet one of two requirements before a state can exercise universal 
jurisdiction: the crime must either be 1) universally condemned by states and therefore 
subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law; or 2) subject 
to universal jurisdiction by international treaty.  Again, these categories are not 
completely self-contained; they overlap. Many of the factors that go into one go into the 
others.  At least in theory, however, fulfillment of one of the latter two categories will 
confer authority to exercise universal jurisdiction.  
IV. Could Drug Trafficking Be a Universal Jurisdiction Crime?
With this general framework in mind, this paper next addresses the question of 
whether a state could prosecute a drug trafficker based on universal jurisdiction.   This 
47 Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations 
Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2000) (“Treaties and 
the doctrine of jus cogens can provide arguments for nonparty nations to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over crimes not subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of 
customary law.”).
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section will consider whether drug trafficking fits any of the four categories outlined 
above. It will first conclude that drug trafficking fits the two traditional justifications for 
universal jurisdiction: it is both necessary as a pragmatic matter and it is a matter of 
international concern because of the human rights problems associated with drug 
trafficking. Next, this paper will conclude that although there is some indication that the 
international community has moved toward accepting drug trafficking as a matter of 
customary international law, that trend has not yet gained enough momentum so that a 
state could base an exercise of universal jurisdiction over a drug trafficker on customary 
international law today.  Furthermore, although the 1988 Convention allows for universal 
jurisdiction in some cases, that treaty is limited in certain serious respects.  Thus, the 
international community needs to take some action before universal jurisdiction is truly 
possible over drug traffickers.     
As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to suggest that the international community 
has or should simply accept universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers in all situations as 
a matter of customary international law.  Customary international law cannot be made 
overnight; it takes the slow development of the law to ripen.  The most direct means of 
establishing universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking is to clearly provide for universal 
jurisdiction by treaty.  As suggested in the introduction to this paper, such a treaty could 
take the form of an additional protocol to the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.  If enough states adhere to this protocol, 
then drug trafficking may become a universal jurisdiction crime as a matter of customary 
international law.   
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A. Is Universal Jurisdiction Over Drug Trafficking Necessary As Pragmatic 
Matter?
The world clearly faces a problem with bringing international drug traffickers to 
justice.  There are a multitude of reasons why drug traffickers may not be prosecuted.  
States that are crippled by drug problems are often unable or unwilling to enforce their 
own drug laws, especially if organized drug trafficking groups are able to bribe or 
terrorize the judiciary.48  Drug traffickers can take advantage of these gaps in 
enforcement by establishing themselves in countries that lack the capability or 
willingness to enforce laws against trafficking.49  Countries that cannot prosecute but that 
are otherwise willing to extradite drug traffickers may refuse to do so out of concern that 
the requesting country will impose harsh prison sentences or death.50  States may also be 
unable to extradite drug traffickers if there is no extradition treaty between the state 
where the drug trafficker is present and the prosecuting state.  Other states may have 
trouble establishing a jurisdictional link to drug traffickers that they wish to prosecute.  
48 With respect to war criminals, it has been argued that, “[s]ince war criminals often 
operate with the knowledge and assistance of local political and legal authorities, 
domestic law does little to deter these actors.  Prevention and punishment of war crimes 
thus become legal concerns and moral obligations, not just for those governments in 
whose territory crimes occurred, but for all states.” Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting 
Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 153 (1996).  The same argument can 
be made in the case of drug trafficking.
49 Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the 
Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 75, 81 (2000).
50 This is a matter of particular concern to the United States.  See discussion infra Part IV.
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Finally, drug traffickers caught on the high seas are like pirates in the sense that there 
may be no country that is able to prosecute them.51
Universal jurisdiction would provide a remedy to all of these problems because it 
would provide for the prosecution of traffickers by any state.  States that are unwilling or 
unable to prosecute drug traffickers could extradite suspects to countries that wish to 
prosecute under a universal jurisdiction theory.52  Universal jurisdiction may also solve 
the problem that occurs where a requesting state and an extraditing state do not have a 
mutual extradition treaty.  In that case, the extraditing state could extradite to some third 
state (with whom it does have an extraditing treaty) regardless of that third state’s 
jurisdictional links to the suspect or to the crime.  The third state could then prosecute 
under a universal jurisdiction theory.  The state where the accused is found could also 
prosecute on its own, regardless of whether it has any other jurisdictional ties to the 
suspect.  Finally, providing states with a tool to prosecute drug traffickers may send an 
important message to drug traffickers that there are no safe havens for their behavior and 
ultimately may deter some from engaging in large-scale drug trafficking at all.53
Of course, this does not solve the problem of a state that is simply unwilling to 
prosecute or extradite a drug trafficker to any state.  This may be a very real concern in 
countries where drug traffickers have a stranglehold on the judiciary.  In that case, unless 
51 Christina E. Sorensen, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A Move Toward Universal 
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 207, 226-30 (1990) 
(arguing that drug trafficking on the high seas should be subject to universal jurisdiction 
because it is analogous to piracy). 
52 Of course, states may still be unwilling to extradite if the drug trafficker has bribed or 
terrorized members of the judiciary. 
53 This argument has been made in supporting the exercise of universal jurisdiction over 
terrorists.  James D. Fry, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The 
Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 197-98 
(2002). 
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a state uses questionable “self-help” (i.e. kidnapping) practices, the fact that a state may 
assert universal jurisdiction will not solve the problem of getting a suspected drug 
trafficker within its grasp.  As stated above, universal jurisdiction will not solve all of the 
practical problems associated with bringing drug traffickers to justice.  It will, however, 
allow states to prosecute where they could not prosecute before.  
Although these are clear pragmatic reasons for asserting universal jurisdiction 
over drug trafficking crimes, it is not at all clear that the practical need for universal 
jurisdiction in the case of drug trafficking is terribly pressing.  The fact of the matter is 
that there will frequently be some state that can establish jurisdiction by traditional means 
that can prosecute.  It may therefore be that universal jurisdiction would be so rarely 
invoked as to be of no real practical significance.  
On the other hand, at least one scholar has pointed out that universal jurisdiction 
has rarely, if ever, been invoked in the case of piracy54 - and it is widely accepted that 
piracy is a universal jurisdiction crime under the pragmatic rationale.55   Thus, it does not 
seem to be a requirement of universal jurisdiction that it need be regularly invoked or 
regularly required in order to bring perpetrators to justice; it only need be theoretically 
required to solve practical problems that arise in ensuring prosecution.  Indeed, universal 
jurisdiction, while widely accepted as being a viable tool for some crimes, has rarely ever 
54 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation 10, at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=385900 (last visited April 3, 2003).
55 Indeed, International Court of Justice President Guillaume asserted in his separate 
opinion in Congo v. Belgium, that “international law knows only one true case of 
universal jurisdiction: piracy.” Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. (14 February) (separate opinion of president Guillaume). 
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been used.56  It is, by definition, a tool that should only be used in extreme situations 
where there is truly no one else with a willingness or ability to prosecute. 
Another possible problem is that the pragmatic justification for asserting universal 
jurisdiction seems to be a thing of the past.  While it is quite clear that piracy continues to 
be recognized as a universal jurisdiction crime, that recognition originally came almost 
two centuries ago and is mostly of historical significance today.  Since that time, the 
international community seems only to recognize new universal jurisdiction crimes when 
the crimes are extremely egregious and lead to significant human suffering or loss of life.  
This trend might close the door to recognizing universal jurisdiction in drug cases absent 
some evidence of the great harm caused by international drug trafficking.57  At the same 
time, many scholars suggest that piracy is still not only viable but that it serves as a basis 
for all modern universal jurisdiction crimes.58  If this is indeed the case, then piracy must 
also be a valid model for new universal jurisdiction crimes.59
In short, although the practical need for universal jurisdiction in drug trafficking
cases is not always overwhelming, there is a need for states to be able to prosecute drug 
traffickers regardless of their territorial links to crimes, perpetrators, or effects.  If indeed 
the international community still recognizes practicality as a basis for assertion of 
56 M. Charif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives & Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 83 (2001).    
57 The question of whether drug trafficking is a great cause of human suffering is
addressed infra Part II.  
58 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation, at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=385900 (last visited April 3, 2003) (noting 
that states have established modern universal jurisdiction crimes “by invoking piracy as a 
justification, precedent and inspiration.”).  
59 At least one scholar has suggested that basing modern universal jurisdiction on the 
paradigm of piracy is a false premise given the different rationales underlying the two 
types of universal jurisdiction crime (pragmatic versus humanitarian).  Id.  This view, 
however, is not widely shared.
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universal jurisdiction by states, then drug trafficking seems to fit under this theory as a 
universal jurisdiction crime.   
B. Is the Drug Trafficking So Egregious that it is a Matter of Concern to All 
Nations?
States may assert universal jurisdiction in cases where the nature of the crime is 
so egregious that it is in the interest of entire the international community to bring 
perpetrators to justice.60  Crimes such as genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, 
slavery, and war crimes all are subject to universal jurisdiction under this theory.  This 
section addresses the question of whether drug trafficking is of sufficient humanitarian 
concern to justify the prosecution of offenders based on a universal jurisdiction theory. 
The harms that drug trafficking causes across the world are well known.61  Drug 
trafficking destabilizes governments, corrupts officials, results in the murder and deaths 
of tens of thousands of people every year, wreaks havoc on the environment and provides 
funding for terrorists.  The international community has long recognized the grave 
consequences of drug trafficking on the world’s population.  Beginning with the 
enactment of the International Opium Convention in 1912,62 states began a serious effort 
to combat the problems associated with drug trafficking on an international level.  This 
united effort has continued with the enactment of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
60 For example, one commentator has argued that universal jurisdiction should apply to 
war crimes because they “involve violent and predatory actions that descend to the level 
of gross bestiality.” Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal 
Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
153, 166 (1996).
61 See infra Part II.
62 Convention Relating to the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs, 
January 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187. 
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Drugs in 1961,63 the Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 1971,64 and the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances in 1988.65  Each of these Conventions contains language that recognizes the 
seriousness of the global drug problem and the need for the international community to 
work together to bring traffickers to justice.  For example, the preamble to the1988 
Convention recognizes that the world is “[d]eeply concerned by the magnitude of and 
rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of human 
beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of society.”66
The convention goes on to recognize the link between drug traffic and organized crime, 
the “danger of incalculable gravity” posed by the use of children in the drug trade, and 
the harms caused to “society at all its levels” by drug trafficking.67  Thus, it is clear that 
drug trafficking is well regarded by the international community as a matter of serious 
concern.    
Despite the obvious harms caused by the drug trade, there is one major difference 
between the crime of drug trafficking and other crimes subject to universal jurisdiction 
based on the humanitarian rationale.  There is a serious debate over whether 
63 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 
1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204, amended by 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, March 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3.
64 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, February 21,1971, 32 U.S.T. 
543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175.
65 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), 28 I.L.M. 493.
66United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, pmbl., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), 28 I.L.M. 493.
67 Id.
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decriminalization of the drug trade could solve many of the world’s drug problems.68  In 
theory, decriminalization would make drug trafficking less attractive to organized crime 
elements because it would do away with the “risk premium” associated with the trade.69
Disassociating the drug trade from organized crime could therefore result in a large drop 
in the level of violence associated with narcotics.70  This argument differentiates drug 
trafficking from other universal jurisdiction crimes in a significant sense.  At least in 
theory, the drug trade can be disassociated from some of its terrible human rights 
consequences.  Disassociation is simply not possible with other universal jurisdiction 
crimes.  Decriminalization is not an option with a crime like genocide or crimes against 
humanity because the crime cannot be separated from the harm.  In this sense, the 
humanitarian effects of drug trafficking are fundamentally different from those associated 
with universal jurisdiction crimes, such as genocide or torture. It is unclear whether this 
difference is sufficient to prevent drug trafficking from becoming a universal jurisdiction 
crime.          
The reality is that the decriminalization argument is unlikely to succeed any time 
soon.  Most countries, especially the United States, are steadfast in their belief that the 
68 Robert MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Cocaine, Marijuana, and Heroin, 13 THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT 10 (June 13, 2002) (discussing the legalization debate and concluding that, 
“legalization of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin would lead to large reductions in drug-
related crime and mortality, but also to large increases in drug use and addiction.”). 
69 Peter Reuter, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: DRUG SMUGGLING (DRAFT), abstract, at
http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/reuter/cambridge.pdf (“A kilo purchased for 
$2,000 in Cali will sell for $15,000 in Miami.  This may be a return for taking the risks 
involved; perhaps 40 percent of all cocaine shipped is seized along the way, couriers 
require high payments for assuming risks and corrupt officials in producer and 
transshipment countries add further taxes.”). 
70 Of course, decriminalization does not do away with all of the harms caused by the drug 
trade; it would do nothing to combat problems associated with addiction nor would it 
help lower the death rate associated with the ingestion of drugs. 
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drug trade should not be made legal and have signed international agreements pledging to 
criminalize and prosecute drug trafficking.71  As long as the drug trade remains illegal, it 
will be inexorably linked with organized crime, murder, the degradation of government, 
human rights abuses, and even terrorism.  These are the same types of human rights 
problems that are associated with other universal jurisdiction crimes.  It does not make 
sense to treat drug trafficking differently based on what would happen if one day all 
states suddenly decided to decriminalize.  The bottom line is that drug trafficking does 
cause great harm to the world, and the world should be able to use any of the tools at its 
disposal to eradicate those harms, including exercising universal jurisdiction.  Thus, 
states could probably exercise universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers based on the 
theory that the narcotics trade is so egregious as to be a matter of concern to all nations.         
C. Is Drug Trafficking Subject to Universal Jurisdiction As a Matter of 
Customary International Law?
The international community recognizes that a principle can become international 
law if 1) it is demonstrated in state practice and 2) states believe that the practice is 
required by international law (opinio juris).72  Once a principle has satisfied these two 
criteria, it is referred to as customary international law and is binding upon all states, 
regardless of whether or not the law is formally recognized by treaty or other 
international agreement.  Evidence of customary international law is found in: 1) the 
71 166 States are currently parties to the 1988 Convention which requires criminalization 
of drug trafficking offenses.  See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, December 19, 1998, art. 3, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 4 (1990), 28 I.L.M. 493.     
72 Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE & ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 15, 21 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999) (citations omitted).
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writings of legal scholars; 2) international conventions; and 3) national law.73  One must 
therefore examine each of these sources in order to discover whether drug trafficking 
could be a universal jurisdiction crime as a matter of customary international law.  
Ultimately, this section concludes that while there is some evidence that the law has 
begun to develop, state practice and belief is not yet consistent enough to call drug 
trafficking a universal jurisdiction crime as a matter of customary international law.    
First, although the writing of legal scholars suggests optimism over the prospects 
of subjecting drug traffickers to universal jurisdiction, 74 it is not widely accepted among 
legal scholars as one of the ‘main’ universal jurisdiction crimes.  For example, one author 
suggests that drug trafficking, “like other crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, could 
be deemed a problem of all nation-states.  Thus a drug trafficker could be deemed hostis 
humani generis, enemy of all mankind, for which universal jurisdiction should apply.”75
73See M. Charif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives & Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 105 (2001).  
74 M. Charif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives & Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81 (Fall 2001) (recognizing 
that the prosecute or extradite provisions in international drug conventions provides for 
universal jurisdiction); Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A 
Weapon for All Nations Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L. 1, 
29-30 (2000) (“With the United States pressure on its war against drugs, drug trafficking 
may become the newest crime subject to universal jurisdiction. . .”  “a drug trafficker 
could be considered hostis humani generis, enemy of all mankind, for which universal 
jurisdiction should apply); Christina E. Sorensen, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A 
Move Toward Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
207 (1990) (arguing that universal jurisdiction should be extended to prosecute drug 
smugglers on the high seas); Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the 
United States Should Support the Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International 
Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 75 (2000); Christopher L. Blakesley, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE & 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 33 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999) (noting that “[t]here is a 
growing trend to include traffic in narcotic drugs” as a universal jurisdiction crime).  
75 Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations 
Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (2000).
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Yet this author buries his suggestion among a list of offenses that could potentially be 
accepted as a universal jurisdiction crime – it is not listed as one of the crimes for which 
universal jurisdiction is widely accepted.  Several other scholars have suggested that drug 
trafficking is well enough established as a matter of treaty law that it has become 
applicable to all states as a matter of customary international law.76  Again, however, this 
view is not widely enough shared that drug trafficking can be definitively categorized as 
a universal jurisdiction crime under customary international law.     
Despite assertions by some legal scholars, there is certainly no general consensus 
that drug trafficking should be afforded universal jurisdiction.  Scholarly works abound 
which discuss the application of universal jurisdiction to genocide or war crimes,77 but 
drug trafficking has only been mentioned peripherally, if at all.  During drafting of the 
Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court,78 parties debated, but 
ultimately rejected a proposal to include drug trafficking in the Court’s jurisdiction.79
76 See, e.g., Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or 
Extradite, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE & ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS 15, 18 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
77 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 17 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. 
Green ed., 1998).  
78 The International Criminal Court cannot exercise universal jurisdiction over any crime.  
Thus, even if drug trafficking had been established as one of the crimes punishable by the 
ICC, the ICC still would not have been able to exercise universal jurisdiction over drug 
traffickers.  The rejection of drug trafficking by the drafters of the Rome Statute is still 
significant for the purposes of this paper because the crimes that do fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Court – such as crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes –
are the types of crimes that tend to be clearly established as subject to universal 
jurisdiction under customary international law. 
79 Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the 
Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 75, 92 (2000) (citations omitted) (“Although the Draft Statute specifically included 
‘crimes involving the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, interest 
in a Court with jurisdiction over narcotics trafficking waned during the concluding days 
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Likewise, the drafters of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction chose not to 
include drug trafficking in its list of crimes that all states should accept as universal 
jurisdiction crimes, 80 although there was serious debate over whether or not drug crimes 
should be included.81  The fact that drug trafficking was included in the debate at all 
suggests that it may be developing into a well-recognized universal jurisdiction crime.  
The fact that it was rejected by both the drafters of the Princeton Principles and by the 
drafters of the statute of the International Criminal Court suggests, however, that 
universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking has not quite reached the level of customary 
international law.   
In addition to the works of legal scholars, international law also provides some 
evidence that the world community considers drug trafficking to be so egregious that 
states may prosecute suspected traffickers under a universal jurisdiction theory.  The 
1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances creates obligations among party states to criminalize drug 
trafficking.82  The convention clearly allows some states to prosecute drug traffickers 
of the conference.  The delegates could not agree on a generally acceptable definition of 
the crime, and they removed drug trafficking from the final Statute.”). 
80 Principle 2(1) lists the following crimes: 1)piracy; 2) slavery; 3) war crimes; 4) crimes 
against peace; 5) crimes against humanity; 6) genocide; and 7) torture.  PRINCETON 
PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION princ. 2(1) (2001).  The Principles make it clear, however that they do not 
interfere with the further development of universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law.  See id. at princs. 2(2) & 13(3).  Thus, the drafters of the Principles 
contemplated the development of new universal jurisdiction crimes.    
81 PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION cmt. 48 (2001) (noting that “drug crimes were raised as 
candidates for inclusion” in the Principles.).
82 See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, December 19, 1998, art. 3, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), 28 
I.L.M. 493. 
28
based on a universal jurisdiction theory.83  Currently, 166 nations are parties to the 1988 
Convention.84  The sheer number of countries that are parties to the treaty suggests a 
consensus that it is acceptable for states to exercise universal jurisdiction over a suspect 
within its territory. 
State practice also suggests that drug trafficking is generally recognized as a 
universal jurisdiction crime as a matter of customary international law.  An examination 
of state legislation over drug trafficking reveals that many states allow prosecution of 
drug traffickers under a universal jurisdiction theory.  For example, France’s code allows 
universal jurisdiction if such jurisdiction is contained in a treaty to which France is a 
party.85  Because France is a party to the 1988 Convention, French law thus provides for 
universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers in some situations.  Germany’s law contains a 
provision stating that German law will apply to certain acts regardless of a territorial link 
to the crime, the victim, or the perpetrator.  The list of specific acts provided for under 
this law includes unauthorized distribution of narcotics.86  The law of Australia clearly 
provides for universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers where the suspect is present in 
Australia and decides not to extradite.87  The laws of Portugal,88 Thailand,89 and 
83 Id. at art. 4.  See also infra Part IV(D).  
84 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION, at: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug_demand_hiv_aids.html. (last visited April 17, 
2003).
85 C. PR. PÉN. art. 689-2 to 689-7.
86 § 6 para. 1 & 9 StGB; § 7 para. 2 StGB.
87 Crimes (Traffic in Drugs and Psychotropic Substances) Act., 1990, No. 97 (Austl.). 
That provision, entitled “Dealing in drugs outside Australia,” provides that: 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence against this section if: 
(a) the person engages, outside Australia, in conduct that is a dealing in 
drugs; and 
(b) the conduct constitutes an offence against the law of a foreign country; 
and 
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Bahrain,90 to name a few examples, contain similar provisions.  Several of these statutes 
were enacted as implementing legislation for the 1988 Convention.  This is evidence of 
(c) the conduct would constitute an offence against a law in force in a 
State or Territory if it were engaged in by the person in that State or 
Territory 
(2) A person may be charged with an offence against this section only if: 
(a) the person is present in Australia; and 
(b) if the person is not an Australian citizen: 
(i) no steps have been taken by foreign country referred to in paragraph (1) 
(b) for the surrender of the person to that country; or 
(ii) proceedings taken by that country under the Extradition Act 1988 have 
not resulted in the person being surrendered to that country. 
88 Diário da República, art. 49 (1991). Assembly of the Republic Resolution No. 29/91 
and Decree of the President of the Republic No. 45/91:
For the purposes of this text, Portuguese criminal law shall also apply to 
acts committed outside the national territory: 
(a) By a foreigner, provided that the perpetrator is in Portugal and not 
extradited; 
(b) Aboard a vessel against which Portugal has been authorized to adopt 
the measures provided for in article 17 of the 1988 United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.
89 General Provisions, c. 1, § 5.
Any person who commits an offence relating to narcotics, despite the fact 
that an offence is committed outside the Kingdom, shall be punished in the 
Kingdom, if it appears that: 
(1) the offender or any one of his accomplices is a Thai person or has a 
place of residence in Thailand; 
(2) the offender is an alien and intends its consequence to occur within the 
Kingdom or the Thai Government is the injured person; or 
(3) the offender is an alien and such offence is an offence under the law of 
the State in the jurisdiction of which the commission has occurred, if such 
offender appears to be in the Kingdom and has not been extradited under 
the law on extradition; 
provided that, section 10 of the Penal Code shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
90 Controlling the Use and Circulation of Narcotic Substances and Preparations, No. 4 (1973):
Article 29 
30
opinio juris, or a belief that states must allow for universal jurisdiction over international 
narcotics dealers.  Thus, it is clear that many states recognize universal jurisdiction over 
drug trafficking as a matter of state practice.  
On the other hand, some states expressly declined to allow for universal 
jurisdiction over drug traffickers.  In the United States is a prime example.  There is no 
statutory law providing for universal jurisdiction.  Furthermore, a federal court 
specifically stated that “[d]rug trafficking is not recognized as being subject to universal 
jurisdiction”91 in interpreting the Marijuana on the High Seas Act  When viewed as a 
whole, state practice indicates that while several states have enacted legislation 
embracing universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking, that trend is not yet firmly enough 
established to suggest that states feel compelled to recognize universal jurisdiction over 
drug traffickers in the long run.    
In sum, although drug trafficking seems to be emerging on the international scene 
as potentially subject to universal jurisdiction, there is simply not enough evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris to assert that drug trafficking is currently a universal 
jurisdiction crime as a matter of customary international law.  It is unrealistic and 
unhelpful to simply assert that states should push for the development of customary 
international law in this area.  Customary international law cannot be formed overnight.  
The provisions of this Law shall apply to any person who commits outside the territory of 
the State of Bahrain an act that makes him a principal perpetrator of or participant in a 
crime specified in this Law which occurs totally or partially in the State of Bahrain. 
Article 30 
Any person in Bahrain shall be punishable by the penalties prescribed in this Law who 
commits an act outside the territory of the State of Bahrain that is considered a crime 
according to the provisions of this Law. 
91 United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 n. 6 (S.D.Fl. 1981). 
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Thus, the next section suggests that reforms should be attempted via treaty and state 
action, rather than through the nebulous world of customary international law.  Ideally, 
these reforms will be comprehensive enough to result in the development of customary 
international law with regard to universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers.    
D. Is Drug Trafficking Subject to Universal Jurisdiction By Treaty?
As discussed above, a treaty may provide for universal jurisdiction.  In the case of 
drug trafficking, the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs allows for the exercise of universal jurisdiction in some situations.  Specifically, 
Article 4, paragraph 2(b) provides that any state may establish jurisdiction over a suspect 
when the suspect is within the territory of that state and where that state decides not to 
extradite the suspect to a third state.92  There is no requirement that the state have any 
link with the offender (other than the offender’s presence), with the crime, or with the 
victims or effects of the crime.  In that sense, paragraph 2(b) is a clear statement of 
universal jurisdiction designed to ensure that a foreign criminal cannot “peacefully enjoy 
the fruits of his crimes” in any state.93  Article 4, paragraph 3 of the treaty also provides 
that the convention “does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established 
by a Party in accordance with its domestic law.”94  Thus, if a party’s domestic law 
92 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), art. 4, para. 2(b), 28 
I.L.M. 493.
93 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. (14 
February) (separate opinion of president Guillaume).
94 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), art. 4, para. 3, 28 I.L.M. 
493.
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establishes universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking offenses, presumably the treaty 
does not preclude that exercise of universal jurisdiction.
The 1988 Convention, however, is limited in major respects and thus does not 
grant true universal jurisdiction.  First, the universal jurisdiction provisions technically 
only apply to states that are parties to the treaty.95  States that are not parties have no 
authority under international law to exercise universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers 
found within their borders. 96  Likewise, it is unclear whether state parties can exercise 
universal jurisdiction over nationals of states that are not parties to the treaty.97  There is 
no easy solution to these problems; they cannot be solved by amending the treaty because 
those states who do not adhere to the amendment still would not be governed by it.  Some 
scholars have suggested that if the provision is so widely recognized as to have become 
customary international law, states may be bound by the treaty regardless of whether or 
95 “The case for an international civitas maxima supporting the duty to prosecute or 
extradite is valid; it is doubtful, however, that it includes universal jurisdiction other than 
a subsidiary jurisdictional basis to enforce the attainment of these goals.  In fact, aut 
dedere aut judicare may well be argued as the substitute for a theory of universal 
jurisdiction.  In this writer’s opinion, universal jurisdiction complements aut dedere aut 
judicare in that whenever a state does not extradite and proceeds to prosecute it may need 
to rely on universality.” M. Charif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes: Historical Perspectives & Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, n. 57 
(2001). 
96But see Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All 
Nations Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L. 1, 25 (2000). 
Jordan notes that “adoption of a general multilateral treaty through the process of 
international organization” demonstrates that states accept universal jurisdiction over the 
offense. Therefore, he argues that these conventions “could be deemed to represent the 
authority of any nation’s right to prosecute offenders, with the only difference being that 
parties to a treaty have an obligation to prosecute or extradite such offenders, while 
nonparties simply have the right to prosecute such offenders.” (citations omitted).   
97 Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of 
Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 366 (2001). 
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not they are parties.98  Yet, as the preceding section suggests, states do not recognize 
universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers as a matter of customary international law and 
it is difficult to simply suggest that it should be recognized as such.  The establishment of 
a new protocol with respect to universal jurisdiction, if widely accepted by states and 
incorporated into their domestic legislation, will, however, assist in the development of 
customary international law over drug trafficking. 
Next, it is not clear that the 1988 Convention allows for universal jurisdiction 
where a party does not wish to prosecute a suspect within its own territory but wishes to 
extradite to a third state party who would then prosecute on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction.  Although a state could argue that Article 4, paragraph 3 (“This Convention 
does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a Party in 
accordance with its domestic law”) provides authority to exercise universal jurisdiction in 
such a situation, the authority is not clearly or affirmatively stated.  As pointed out by 
President Guillaume in his separate opinion in the case of Congo v. Belgium, the 1988 
Convention and other treaties with prosecute or extradite requirements do not 
contemplate “establishing jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by foreigners 
against foreigners when the perpetrator is not present in the territory of the State in 
question. Universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to international conventional 
law.”99
98 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
403 (1987) (“Universal jurisdiction for additional offenses is provided by international 
agreements, but it remains to be determined whether universal jurisdiction over a 
particular offense has become customary law for states not party to such an agreement.”).  
99 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. (14 
February) (separate opinion of president Guillaume).
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Furthermore, as a matter of international law, a state may not exercise universal 
jurisdiction unless it has explicit authority to do so either based on a treaty or based on 
customary international law.  The 1988 Convention recognizes this premise is by stating 
that the “[p]arties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner 
consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and 
that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States.”100    The general tradition 
against recognizing true universal jurisdiction in treaty law creates a presumption that the 
treaty does not confer true universal jurisdiction, regardless of its general statement that 
the convention “does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by 
a Party in accordance with its domestic law.”101  A treaty must contain a clear statement 
of intent in order to overcome this presumption against imposition of universal 
jurisdiction.  The proposed additional protocol to the 1988 Convention should contain 
such a statement of intent so that there is no question that the protocol confers true 
universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers in all situations. 
Finally, the 1988 Convention differs in a significant respect from other treaties 
that establish universal jurisdiction over other offenses.  The 1988 Convention provides 
that a state where the suspect is found may prosecute under a universal jurisdiction 
theory; the language of the treaty is permissive rather than mandatory.  In this sense, the 
1988 Convention differs from several other treaties with similar prosecute or extradite 
language.   For example, the Convention Against Torture provides that “[e]ach State 
100 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), art. 2(2), 28 I.L.M. 493.
101 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), art. 4, para. 3, 28 I.L.M. 
493.
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Party shall likewise take measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its 
jurisdiction and it does not extradite him.”102  In other words, a state that has the accused 
in its territory must prosecute if it chooses not to extradite.  The language in the 1970 
Hague Hijacking Convention is even stronger.  That Convention states that, “[t]he 
Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does 
not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the 
offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for 
the purpose of prosecution.”103  The 1988 Convention, on the other hand, provides that 
states are only required to prosecute (if they do not extradite) in cases where they can 
establish territorial jurisdiction.104 The choice to exercise universal jurisdiction if there is 
no other jurisdictional link, on the other hand, is permissive.  
These shortcomings in the 1988 Convention leave several gaps in states’ ability to 
prosecute suspected drug traffickers.  Adopting an additional protocol establishing true 
universal jurisdiction would close some of these gaps by ensuring that there would 
always be a state that is willing and able to prosecute.  This protocol would need to 
clearly establish jurisdiction by any state, regardless of where the suspect is located, and 
102 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027, art. 5, para. 2, (1985) (emphasis added).
103Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Hijcaking 
Convention) 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, art. 7 (1970).  The Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation contains 
substantially the same language. 27 I.L.M. 668, art. 7(5)(1).
104 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, December 19, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 4 (1990), art. 4, para. 1(a), 28 
I.L.M. 493 (requiring states to establish jurisdiction where “(i) The offence is committed 
in its territory; (ii) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft 
which is registered under its laws at the time the offence is committed.”
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regardless of other connections between the perpetrator, the crime, and the prosecuting 
state.  At the very least, the international community could bring the 1988 Convention in 
line with other international agreements, such as the Convention Against Torture, to 
require that prosecution be mandatory in a case where the state where the accused is 
found chooses not to extradite. 
IV. Arguments Against the Establishment of Universal Jurisdiction Over Drug
Trafficking Offenses.
No discussion of universal jurisdiction is complete without some recognition of 
the substantial body of opinion that universal jurisdiction is unwise and should not be 
expanded.  Although these arguments are valid in some situations, they are not strong 
enough in the case of drug trafficking to counterbalance the potential harms caused by the 
international drug trade.  Furthermore, the development of uniform rules on universal 
jurisdiction, such as those contained in the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 
provide adequate solutions to most of the arguments against universal jurisdiction.  
Drafters of the protocol to the 1988 Convention could insert rules like those contained in 
the Princeton Principles to ensure clear and fair application of universal jurisdiction in the 
specific context of drug trafficking.  
Perhaps the most significant reason why states are resistant to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is concern that it will interfere with national sovereignty.  Indeed, 
the integrity of national sovereignty is one of the most basic principles underlying 
international law and jurisdictional rules are intended to maintain that integrity.  For this 
reason, the rules of jurisdiction generally require that only states with some territorial link 
to a crime, to a perpetrator, or to a victim may prosecute offenders.  Universal jurisdiction 
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is an exception to this rule, reserved for extreme cases that are well established under 
customary international law.105
On the other hand, there is evidence that customary international law may be 
beginning to change.  In an era where human rights abuses have become a matter of 
international concern, states have begun to recognize “an obligation on the part of state 
officials to cooperate in assuring the repression of offenses harmful to the international 
community.”106  To that end, the world community has entered into numerous treaties 
requiring states to prosecute or extradite offenders found in their territories.  These 
treaties are a recognition that universal jurisdiction over some offenses, including drug 
trafficking, may be necessary to combat transnational crime.  The sheer number of 
treaties with prosecute or extradite requirements may signal a change in the way in which 
states view power to prosecute.  Some commentators even argue that the prosecute or 
extradite requirement has become a rule of customary international law for any serious 
transnational crime.107  As the law develops, states’ arguments based on traditional 
concepts of national sovereignty weaken.108  Once universal jurisdiction is accepted as a 
matter of customary international law over a particular offense, the international 
105 See R. v. Bartle (Ex parte Pinochet), H.L. (1998) (separate opinion of Lord Slynn of 
Hadley).
106 Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE & ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 15, 17 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
107 Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE & ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 15, 19-20 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
108 “The policy of holding persons accountable for international crimes has become more 
widespread and, in turn, has led to an increased use of universal jurisdiction by third 
party states.”  Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or An 
International Criminal Court Accomplish This Goal? 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 357, 367 
(2002). 
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community has already made a judgment that the prosecution of certain offenses trumps 
traditional notions of state sovereignty.   
A related objection to the use of universal jurisdiction is the concern that it will 
create conflict between states.109  The United States and other countries have appealed to 
traditional notions of sovereignty in expressing apprehension that overzealous 
prosecutors will use universal jurisdiction to “flex their muscles against anyone and hope, 
through extradition proceedings, to obtain personal jurisdiction to put their targets on 
trial.”110  Indeed, there is a common concern that “the universal jurisdiction concept is 
subject to potential manipulation and abuse”111 and that government officials might be 
subject to prosecution for political reasons. 
Although overzealous prosecutors present a problem, the solution should not be to bar 
universal jurisdiction per se.  Instead, the international community should establish clear 
principles regarding when and where universal jurisdiction can be used.  Well-established 
principles would leave universal jurisdiction as a viable tool for states while ensuring that 
prosecutors use universal jurisdiction uniformly and without bias toward any particular 
nation.112  For example, laying out a clear hierarchy of which state(s) will have the first 
opportunity to prosecute in cases where more that one state wishes to prosecute will deter 
109 Madeline Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 
NEW ENG. L.REV. 337, 340 (2001). 
110 David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Opening Address, 
Symposium, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, 35 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 233, 238 (2001). 
111 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 
325 (2001). 
112 See generally, Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or An 
International Criminal Court Accomplish This Goal? 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 357 (2002) 
(arguing for uniformity in the exercise of universal jurisdiction).
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potential conflict.  The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction has already 
proposed model rules with regard to universal jurisdiction.113  In specifically responding 
to the issue of prosecutorial abuse, the Introduction to the Principles notes that it placed 
“throughout the Principles legal and judicial safeguards to help deter potential abuses.”114
Any other concerns that are specific to the case of drug trafficking could likewise be 
addressed in an additional protocol to the 1988 Convention.  Although not a fail-safe 
solution, these attempts at codification largely address the states’ concerns about 
interference with state sovereignty and overzealous prosecutors.  
A third concern with universal jurisdiction is that there is “no assurance that the 
prosecuting nations will apply fair standards of criminal procedure in adjudicating these 
cases.”115  Likewise, some commentators have noted the potential for double jeopardy in 
cases where any state has the ability to prosecute.116  Again, states can deal with these 
problems by establishing clear due process rules up front.  Treaty provisions allowing for 
universal jurisdiction can provide that the right to exercise universal jurisdiction extends 
only states that are willing to prosecute in accordance with internationally accepted due 
process principles. 
One issue that cannot be dealt with by establishing guidelines on how to implement 
universal jurisdiction rules is the question of why drug trafficking should be marked as
113 PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001). 
114 Mary Robinson, Forward to PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 26-27 (2001). 
115 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 
325, 325 (2001). 
116 Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 17, 31 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green 
ed., 1998).  
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the next universal jurisdiction crime rather than other international crimes, such as 
trafficking in women, money laundering, or arms trafficking.  As more crimes are added 
to the list, there is no logical limit to what crimes are and are not subject to universal 
jurisdiction.  This question goes to the very heart of the debate over universal jurisdiction.  
Universal jurisdiction is supposed to be a very narrow exception to traditional 
jurisdictional rules, used only as an “exceptional measure,”117 because it does transcend 
traditional notions of state sovereignty.  If universal jurisdiction were expanded to “a 
broad range of ordinary crimes, there would be no raison d’être for the other bases of 
jurisdiction”118 and traditional notions of jurisdiction would fly out the window.  
In theory, this is a legitimate concern.  As discussed above, however, the international 
community has already embraced universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking to a certain 
extent and there is a trend toward the development of customary international law with 
respect to universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking.  Thus, debates over whether the 
acceptance of universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers will lead to a slippery slope are 
in reality detached from trends that are actually occurring in the international community.  
If the international community were indeed concerned about a slippery slope, it could 
work to halt universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking.  Instead, states have gone out of 
their way to expand the availability of universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers.      
In the end, all of these arguments against the use of universal jurisdiction must be 
weighed against the potential benefits of ensuring that drug traffickers are prosecuted.  As 
117 Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 17, 19 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green 
ed., 1998).  
118 Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 17, 18-19 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green 
ed., 1998).  
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noted above, drug trafficking has appalling consequences for people throughout the 
world.  There may be risks in embracing universal jurisdiction, but the international 
community must ask itself whether those risks are sufficient enough to justify allowing 
kingpins and murderers to go free.    
V.       The United States Should Support the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction 
Over Drug Trafficking.
The United States has a strong interest in bringing international drug traffickers to 
justice.119  It has long been the largest consumer of narcotics120 and has long been the 
leader in the global war on drugs. 121  Given the link between narcotics trafficking and 
terrorism, the United States has a greater interest than ever before in the seeing that 
perpetrators are bought to justice.  The State Department has identified extradition of 
offenders to face prosecution in the U.S. as “one of the most effective tools to help other 
governments break up trafficking organizations”122 because of the deterrent effect of 
strict penalties enforced in the U.S.   The ability to exercise universal jurisdiction would 
119 “The United States has a strong interest in seeing that more international drug 
traffickers are brought to justice, whether in the United States, in other national justice 
systems, or in an international court.” Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why 
the United States Should Support the Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International 
Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 75, 76 (2000). 
120 Peter Reuter, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: DRUG SMUGGLING (DRAFT), 1, at
http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/reuter/cambridge.pdf (noting that the United 
States is the largest market for drugs in the world). See also Sharon A. Gardner, A Global 
Initiative to Deter Drug Trafficking: Will Internaltionalizing the Drug War Work? 7 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 287, 306-07 (1993) (describing U.S. involvement in the 
international drug trade).
121 “With the United States pressure on its war against drugs, drug trafficking may 
become the newest crime subject to universal jurisdiction.” Jon B. Jordan, Universal 
Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations Against International 
Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L.1, 29 (2000).
122 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2, 8 (2003).
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assist the United States in obtaining jurisdiction to extradite suspected drug traffickers, 
regardless of whether or not the U.S. can establish a definitive link between the accused 
trafficker and the U.S. 
Recognizing universal jurisdiction will also benefit to the United States indirectly. 
Many states are unwilling to extradite their nationals to the United States for prosecution 
because of the harsh laws in place here123 or for other political reasons.124  As one author 
notes, “[a]n obstacle often overlooked is that states requesting extradition are generally 
‘consumers,’ such as the U.S., and the ‘producer’ states view such consumers as the 
cause of the drug trade.”125  Providing those countries with the option of extraditing to a 
third country that is willing to exercise universal jurisdiction may solve this problem.  
Other states may be unwilling to extradite because of the harsh punishments, 
including the death penalty, faced by drug traffickers in the United States.  One example 
of this trend is presented by the Mexican Supreme Court’s recent holding that Mexico 
may not extradite nationals who face life sentences in other countries.126  Because U.S. 
law provides such harsh penalties for drug traffickers, this would effectively prevent 
extradition of suspects from Mexico to the United States.127  If Mexico accepts drug 
123 Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support 
the Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 75, 82-83 (2000) (discussing the difficulties that the United States has had in the 
past in extraditing nationals from other countries to the United States). 
124 Id.
125 Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support 
the Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 75, 82-83 (2000).
126 J.S.C. 2001.  This decision is referenced in: BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. 
ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 
STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2, 8 (2003).
127 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT AFF., U.S. DEP’T ST., 2002 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, ch. 2, 8(2003). 
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trafficking as a universal jurisdiction crime, Mexico would be able to extradite those 
suspects to third countries (if unwilling to prosecute themselves) for prosecution.  Of 
course, this is a less than ideal solution to the problem from the perspective of the United 
States because it may mean that drug traffickers will be dealt with less harshly.  Yet it is 
unlikely that countries like Mexico will be willing to back down from their policies 
regarding extradition to the United States just because universal jurisdiction is 
unavailable to them.  The availability of universal jurisdiction is unlikely to influence the 
debate over whether countries should extradite suspected drug traffickers to the United 
States.  What universal jurisdiction will provide is another option for prosecution when a 
state decides not to extradite to the United States.  In the long run, allowing for universal 
jurisdiction will ensure that that suspected criminals will not go free, and that is clearly in 
the United States’ interest.
The United States’ interest in accepting universal jurisdiction is clearly presented 
in a case that came before the District Court for the Northern District of Florida in 1981, 
United States v. James-Robinson.128  In that case, the U.S. Coast Guard stopped a 
stateless ship in international waters 400 miles off of the coast of the United States.129
The ship was filled with drugs.  Upon a motion to dismiss the indictment, the court 
considered whether, under the Marijuana on the High Seas Act, the United States had 
jurisdiction to prosecute those on board where there was no allegation (aside from the 
ship’s location) that the drugs on the ship were intended for distribution in the U.S.130
Noting that “[d]rug trafficking is not recognized as being subject to universal 
128 United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.Supp. 1340 (S.D.Fl. 1981).
129 James-Ronbinson, 515 F.Supp. at 1340. 
130 Id.
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jurisdiction,”131 the court granted a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that 
there was no nexus with the United States and therefore no subject matter jurisdiction 
over the perpetrators.132  The result of this case is clear: the United States was unable to 
prosecute suspected drug traffickers because it was unable to establish jurisdiction.  Had 
the U.S. recognized drug trafficking as a universal jurisdiction crime, these alleged 
traffickers would have faced trial and punishment in the United States. 
In general, the United States has declared itself to be against the concept of 
universal jurisdiction.133  However, this has never been a consistent position.  In fact, the 
only consistent statement that can be made about the United States’ approach to universal 
jurisdiction is that it supports it when to do so is within the United States’ best interests; it 
rejects universal jurisdiction where the exercise of such jurisdiction could have 
detrimental effects on the U.S.  David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes 
Issues under President Clinton openly stated that, “[a]s a government, the United States 
recognizes universal jurisdiction for certain crimes under certain circumstances.”134  If for 
no other reason, the U.S. government should thus choose to support the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking because it is in the country’s best interests to 
do so.
131 Id. at n. 6.
132 Id. at 1347. 
133 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 
347 (2001) (“[t]here is substantial treaty and statutory authority for exercising universal 
jurisdiction in the criminal context, yet the United States has rarely if ever exercised 
universal criminal jurisdiction.”).
134 David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Opening Address, 
Symposium, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, 35 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 233, 234 (2001). 
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There are several situations in which the United States has accepted universal 
jurisdiction in the past.  For example, the United States has always supported the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction with respect to piracy.135  The federal piracy statute provides for 
prosecution of anyone who is a pirate, as defined by the laws of nations.136  The Hostage 
Taking Act provides for U.S. jurisdiction over anyone who “whether inside or outside the 
United States, seizes or detains and threatens . . . another person in order to compel a 
third person or governmental organization” to do something.137  The United States has 
also recognized universal jurisdiction with regard to the crime of torture.138  Recently, the 
United States government actively sought out and encouraged states to exercise universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute Pol Pot, Kurdish rebel leader Ocalan, senior leaders of the Iraqi 
regime, and former Chilean Dictator Augusto Pinochet.139  In the case of In the Matter of 
Demjanjuk,140 a U.S. District Court approved extradition of an alleged Nazi conspirator 
based on the fact that “[i]nternational law provides that certain offenses may be punished 
by any state because the offenders are ‘common enemies of all mankind and all nations 
have an equal interest in their punishment.’” The fact that the United States does accept 
135 Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All 
Nations Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DCL J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2000) (citing 
United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844). 
136 Piracy and Privateering Act, 18 USC § 1651 (1948).
137 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1988).
138 18 USC § 2340 A(b) (1994) (providing for jurisdiction over alleged offenders if 
“present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged 
offender.”). 
139 David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Opening Address, 
Symposium, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, 35 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 233, 236 (2001) (noting further that the United States could not exercise universal 
jurisdiction in these cases itself because of applicable statutes of limitations and gaps in 
the United States’ law). 
140 603 F. Supp.1468 (N.D. Ohio), affirmed, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), certioari 
denied, 457 U.S. 1016 (1986).   
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universal jurisdiction in some cases is reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law, which states that the United States recognizes universal jurisdiction over “offenses 
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave 
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of 
terrorism.”141 Thus, it is by no means clear that the United States is against the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in all matters. 
In the case of drug trafficking specifically, the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act 
extends personal jurisdiction within U.S. courts to “a vessel without nationality” and to a 
“vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation has consented or waived 
objection to the enforcement of the United States law by the United States.”142  There is 
no requirement of a nexus with the United States.  In the case of a vessel without 
nationality, this is a clear acceptance of universal jurisdiction in drug trafficking cases on 
the high seas, at least where the U.S. first obtains consent.  Commentators have also 
suggested that U.S. courts have stretched other principles of jurisdiction so far that that 
these courts recognized the exercise of universal jurisdiction as a de facto matter,143 even 
if they claim that they are exercising other types of jurisdiction.144
All of these examples demonstrate that, while the United States may officially 
declare universal jurisdiction to be a bad thing, it has actually embraced universal 
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
403 (1987). 
142 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 
328-29 (2001) (citing United States v. Caicedo, 47 F3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995)).
143 Christina E. Sorensen, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A Move Toward Universal 
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 207, 215-19 (Spring 1990).
144 See Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE & ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 33, 82 (M. Cherif Bassiouni 
ed., 1999).
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jurisdiction in practice.  This does not mean, however, that the United States is for 
universal jurisdiction in all situations. The evidence only seems to demonstrate that the 
U.S. does not mind exercising universal jurisdiction itself or when it benefits the United 
States’ agenda in some way.  The government may be less thrilled at the prospect of 
other countries exercising universal jurisdiction in all situations, mainly because of 
concerns over overzealous prosecutors.  
The United States’ concerns regarding potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion 
are not as relevant in the context of drug trafficking as they are in the case of other 
international crimes.  First, while countries like the United States may be legitimately 
concerned about high-ranking officials being targeted by prosecutors for some universal 
jurisdiction offenses, such as war crimes, presumably, high-ranking officials in the U.S. 
government are not involved in drug trafficking.145  Even if prosecutors were to find drug 
trafficking going on at such high levels, “[p]resumably, the U.S. would not object to 
rooting out major international drug traffickers holding official positions with in the U.S. 
government.”146  The United States’ strong commitment to bringing narcotics traffickers 
to justice weighs heavily against the slight potential that a high ranking United States 
government official could be prosecuted for involvement in international drug trafficking.  
Thus, the United States should accept universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers even 
145 There have been allegations in the past of CIA involvement in drug trafficking. See
CONG. REC. H5,847-48 (1998) (Congresswoman Waters calling for the immediate release 
of the CIA Investigator General’s Classified Report on potential CIA involvement with 
Contra drug traffickers in Nicaragua).  These allegations, however, are twenty years old 
and there have not been recent allegations of such conduct. 
146 Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support 
the Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 75, 96 (2000). 
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where it is not willing to accept universal jurisdiction over other types of international 
criminals, such as war criminals.   
The United States can take several actions to move the international community 
toward accepting drug trafficking as a universal jurisdiction crime.  As suggested above, 
the U.S. can propose an additional protocol to the 1988 Convention clearly extending 
universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers and champion the effort to bring other states 
on board.  The United States has such influence in this area that it is likely to succeed in 
its efforts. Accepting universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking crimes will provide an 
overall benefit to the United States by ensuring a credible threat of prosecution of drug 
traffickers no matter where they are found and thereby creating an effective deterrent 
throughout the world.    
V. Conclusion
The human consequences of drug trafficking are appalling and, for the past 
century, states have widely agreed that they must work together to combat the evils 
caused by the international narcotics trade.  Despite massive investments of time and 
resources, this international effort has not been easy.  The promise of prosecution has not 
always been an effective deterrent to drug traffickers because they tend to operate beyond 
the reach of criminal jurisdiction.  Providing states with the ability to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over drug traffickers will provide a tool that will help states in ensuring that 
traffickers are faced with a real threat of prosecution.  
Although there is some international treaty law conferring universal jurisdiction, 
that law is not comprehensive enough such that any state can prosecute drug traffickers 
wherever they are found.  States can fill this gap by enacting an additional protocol to the 
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1988 Convention conferring true universal jurisdiction and making it mandatory that 
states where drug traffickers are found must prosecute if they do not extradite.  If this 
additional protocol is widely enough accepted and enforced in state practice, customary 
international law will develop making drug trafficking a true universal jurisdiction crime.  
The United States should lead this effort because of its particularly strong interest in 
deterring drug trafficking.
These reforms will not be a panacea for the problem of international narcotics 
trafficking.  They will, however, provide a tool that states can use to deter and punish 
traffickers.  Ideally, the ability to exercise universal jurisdiction will ensure that those 
who destabilize governments, who enlist children in the drug trade, who use drugs as a 
means of funding terrorism, and who commit heinous crimes in pursuit of the drug trade 
will not operate with impunity but will face punishment, no matter where they are found.
